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  • Artykuł pochodzi z numeru IUSTITIA 4(38)/2019, dodano 26 marca 2020.

Sędziowska odwaga – notka filozofa prawa

prof. Jerzy Zajadło
(inne teksty tego autora)

Judicial courage – a note of a philosopher of law

The article is aimed at answering the question whether courage is necessary for fulfilling the office of a judge. The author not only gives an affirmative answer, but also concludes that judicial courage is actually one of the cardinal virtues necessary in the administration of justice. The article discusses several different aspects of the notion – from personal to institutional courage. The author also presented the fundamental assumptions of one of the latest philosophical currents – virtue jurisprudence. The subject seems to be especially topical in the context of the discussion on judicial independence which has been going on for several years now in Polish public space. Key words:judges, courage, virtues, administration of justice

* Autor jest specjalistą w zakresie teorii i filozofii prawa, profesorem zwyczajnym WPiA Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

1 D. Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity, „Cleveland State Law Review” Nr 1/2009, vol. 57, s. 1–33.

2 P. Korfanty-Pisana, R. Skwira, M. Żmijewska, Courage in Judge’s Service. Norm or Exception? (zob. https://ejtn.eu – dostęp 15.12.2019 r.).

3 K. Huigens, Justice and the Intellectual Virtues [w:] I. Fileva (red.), Questions of Character, Oxford University Press, New York 2017, s. 354–367.

4 Jest sędzią Federal Court of Canada and Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada – zob. L. Martienau, Does Judicial Courage Exist, And If So, Is It Necessary in Democracy?, „Western Journal of Legal Studies” Nr 2/2018, vol. 8, s. 1–33.

5 C. Farrelly, L.B. Solum (red.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008.

6 Zob. np. P. Skuczyński, S. Sykuna (red.), Leksykon etyki prawniczej. 100 podstawowych pojęć, Warszawa 2013, s. 52–55 oraz S. Sykuna (red.), Etyka prawnicza. Zagadnienia podstawowe, Warszawa 2019, s. 189–196.

7 L. Martineau, op. cit., s. 2.

8 Ibidem.

9 Szerzej zob. np. L.B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence. Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, Metaphilosophy Nr 1,2/2003, vol. 32, s. 178–213; idem, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, „Brooklyn Law Review” Nr 2/2004–2005, vol. 30, s. 475–532; idem, A Tournament of Virtue, „Florida State University Law Review” vol. 32/2005, s. 1365–1400.

10 Z. Jędrzejewski, Pojęcie przestępstwa w doktrynie prawa karnego Niemiec hitlerowskich w ujęciu tzw. szkoły kilońskiej, „Ius Novum” Nr 2/2011, s. 13.

11 G.E.M. Anscobne, Modern Moral Philosophy, „Philosophy” Nr 124/1958, vol. 33, s. 1–19.

12 L. Solum, Virtue Juriprudence: Towards an Arettaic Theory of Law [w:] L. Huppes-Cluysenaer, N.M.M. S. Coelho (red.), Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, Springer, Dordrecht–Heidelberg–New York–London 2013, s. 1–31.

13 M. Mangini, Ethics of virtues and the education of the reasonable judge, International Journal of Ethics Education, 2/2017, s. 175–202.

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